Dan just wrote about Benetar's "Better Never to have Been," and this neat thought experiment occurred to me when I was talking to Killian about it.
ETA: here's what I should have written. Some people think that so-called "good experiences" are actually just the cessation of suffering, reprieve from craving, etc. That would mean that the best you can do is break even; that's good, but at best it's only as good as it would have been to not have had those cravings / sufferings in the first places. I'm calling this the ataraxian position; see also antifrustrationism and tranquilism.
Does this fit with our experience? Well, it seems like sleeping people are free from suffering/craving, so sleep is an optimal state (along with nonexistence or complete cessation of suffering) under these theories, and it's less confusing than nonexistence. Now let's compare supposedly "positive" experiences to being asleep. If you think "positive" experiences can't be better than being asleep, you're an ataraxian. If you think "positive" experiences can be better than being asleep, you're not an ataraxian. I'm not an ataraxian.
(Overly complicated original post follows)
This doesn't address Benetar's case directly, but it deals with a related view that I've heard: the view that the "best" outcomes/experiences for people are actually just a minimization of their suffering. For example, eating a tasty meal just amounts to temporarily bringing your suffering from a lack of tasty food down to zero; it's good, but at best it's only as good as it would have been never to have been hungry at all. If you think that the best anyone can do is hit the neutral point (instead of having "positive" experiences), then it's better never to have been born. I'm calling this ataraxian ethics -- I'm sure it has some real name, but I don't know what it is.
Here's the thought experiment that makes me reject ataraxian ethics. In case it gets famous, I'm obligated to give it a name and a little story:
The Late SleeperThe ataraxian would say that this would not be good; when Alice is asleep, she isn't suffering, and according to the ataraxian it's not possible for her to be in a better state than this. At best, this experience could be as good as remaining asleep, but in order for this to be the case, Alice-at-sunrise would have to be in her literally best possible state, completely free of suffering. If there's any chance of a bad experience during the sunrise (e.g. Alice's coffee is a little too bitter), it would be better for her to remain asleep. In fact, there's no experience at all (!) Alice could have, no matter how "good", that would be better than staying asleep.
Alice is sleeping on a Saturday morning. When she sleeps, she is truly unconscious, and is not experiencing any kind of suffering. There's some chance that she'll happen to wake up early, and if she does, she'll see a beautiful sunrise and enjoy a cup of coffee with a loved one. Whether she wakes and sees the sunrise or sleeps and doesn't see it won't have any further effects on her life. Would it be good for her to happen to wake up early?
This makes me pretty sure I'm not an ataraxian; there are a million things that sound better than being asleep, and I'd be willing to take some suffering (e.g. being sleepy later or risking injury by walking down the stairs) for many of them. I'm pretty sure I'm not just being culturally pressured into saying this, and if I'm fooling myself, I think I've fooled myself into actually enjoying those experiences.
I'm tempted to say that people who might think they're ataraxians should obviously agree with this and stop being ataraxians (probably retreating to saying "OK, there are actual good things beyond cessation of suffering, but the bad outweighs the good in basically every life, so it'd still be better not to exist"), but who knows, people think lots of different things :)
Yeah, no, this is totally great and right in line with the Frustrationism and the Quick-healing person and Buddhism (which all sound to me the same thing), and also sounds like the same as the argument we've had about "are there actually any good experiences?" (I'm gonna lump them all together as "Ataraxian ethics" because that's a great name. If Christoph Fehige was here, maybe he could explain why Frustrationism and Ataraxianism aren't the same, but they basically sound the same.)
ReplyDeleteThe Late Sleeper problem sounds like a useful thought experiment too, and convincing. So I guess I'm not a real Ataraxian - I'd agree with that retreat you said. There are good experiences, but they're way fewer than the bad.
The Remembered vs. Experiencing mind solves this neatly though. Maybe if Alice wakes up early, she will have 47 bad moments and 23 good moments in that extra sunrise-and-coffee hour. Net bad, should have slept in! But, after that hour, she'll remember 2 of the good moments and 1 bad moment. Net good!
(Side note: I want to know what a Buddhist philosopher thinks of Ataraxianism. I kinda sweat the "life is dukkha" thing pretty hard, but like, apparently I also think there are good things, so that is confusing. My current attempt to remain consistent is something like this: "life is 90% hard experiences that just suck, and there are 10% good experiences that still involve suffering (dukkha) but are worth it. meditating/awakening/practicing pañña/whatever is the best way to make that 90% less bad, and that 10% even better.")
Glad this was helpful / on topic! I was mostly thinking of Asymmetry, which this doesn't interact with, but you're right that it opposes those other views. Thanks for mentioning (anti)frustrationism, I think that's probably what I'm talking about? (Googles around) Yep, looks right. Wish it was easy to see the state of the debate on that one.
DeleteI agree re: remembered vs. experiencing -- that's an ethical dimension I don't hear talked about a lot. Not sure what to do with it.