Dan just wrote about Benetar's "Better Never to have Been," and this neat thought experiment occurred to me when I was talking to Killian about it.
ETA: here's what I should have written. Some people think that so-called "good experiences" are actually just the cessation of suffering, reprieve from craving, etc. That would mean that the best you can do is break even; that's good, but at best it's only as good as it would have been to not have had those cravings / sufferings in the first places. I'm calling this the ataraxian position; see also antifrustrationism and tranquilism.
Does this fit with our experience? Well, it seems like sleeping people are free from suffering/craving, so sleep is an optimal state (along with nonexistence or complete cessation of suffering) under these theories, and it's less confusing than nonexistence. Now let's compare supposedly "positive" experiences to being asleep. If you think "positive" experiences can't be better than being asleep, you're an ataraxian. If you think "positive" experiences can be better than being asleep, you're not an ataraxian. I'm not an ataraxian.
(Overly complicated original post follows)
This doesn't address Benetar's case directly, but it deals with a related view that I've heard: the view that the "best" outcomes/experiences for people are actually just a minimization of their suffering. For example, eating a tasty meal just amounts to temporarily bringing your suffering from a lack of tasty food down to zero; it's good, but at best it's only as good as it would have been never to have been hungry at all. If you think that the best anyone can do is hit the neutral point (instead of having "positive" experiences), then it's better never to have been born. I'm calling this ataraxian ethics -- I'm sure it has some real name, but I don't know what it is.
Here's the thought experiment that makes me reject ataraxian ethics. In case it gets famous, I'm obligated to give it a name and a little story:
The Late SleeperThe ataraxian would say that this would not be good; when Alice is asleep, she isn't suffering, and according to the ataraxian it's not possible for her to be in a better state than this. At best, this experience could be as good as remaining asleep, but in order for this to be the case, Alice-at-sunrise would have to be in her literally best possible state, completely free of suffering. If there's any chance of a bad experience during the sunrise (e.g. Alice's coffee is a little too bitter), it would be better for her to remain asleep. In fact, there's no experience at all (!) Alice could have, no matter how "good", that would be better than staying asleep.
Alice is sleeping on a Saturday morning. When she sleeps, she is truly unconscious, and is not experiencing any kind of suffering. There's some chance that she'll happen to wake up early, and if she does, she'll see a beautiful sunrise and enjoy a cup of coffee with a loved one. Whether she wakes and sees the sunrise or sleeps and doesn't see it won't have any further effects on her life. Would it be good for her to happen to wake up early?
This makes me pretty sure I'm not an ataraxian; there are a million things that sound better than being asleep, and I'd be willing to take some suffering (e.g. being sleepy later or risking injury by walking down the stairs) for many of them. I'm pretty sure I'm not just being culturally pressured into saying this, and if I'm fooling myself, I think I've fooled myself into actually enjoying those experiences.
I'm tempted to say that people who might think they're ataraxians should obviously agree with this and stop being ataraxians (probably retreating to saying "OK, there are actual good things beyond cessation of suffering, but the bad outweighs the good in basically every life, so it'd still be better not to exist"), but who knows, people think lots of different things :)
